IMPORTANT UPDATES
The World Health Organization (WHO) reported a total of 8,098 cases of probable SARS throughout the world between November 1, 2002 and July 31, 2003, including 29 cases from the United States. The case-fatality ratio worldwide was 9.6% (n = 774 deaths), with no U.S. deaths reported (WHO, 2003) . SARS re-emerged in China in December 2003, and between December 16 and the end of January, 2004, China has reported four new cases, with no fatalities and no known transmission to contacts (WHO, 2004) . Most important, 1,707 (21%) of the cases in the November 2002 to July 2003 outbreak were among health care workers (HCWs). The percentage of affected HCWs was slightly higher in Hong Kong (22%), and significantly higher in Canada (43%) (WHO, 2003) .
The case definition for SARS was updated on July 17,2003 17, (CDC, 2004c , adding a negative antibody titer for SARS-related coronavirus (SARS CoV) as essential for ruling out SARS in a suspected or probable case. There are still two components to the definition: a clinical component and an epidemiological component. The clinical component includes an asymptomatic or mild respiratory illness; a fever greater than 38°C (100.4°1 F); and some findings of respiratory illness, including cough, shortness of breath, or even hypoxia, although these respiratory signs may not appear for a couple of days. Other authors report clients experiencing headaches, myalgias, and diarrhea prior to or in conjunction with developing the cardinal signs of pneumonia that define the actual syndrome (Avendano, 2003) . These additional clinical findings have been added to the updated case definition of suspected SARS.
The epidemiological criteria involve assessing the client's possible exposure to SARS through travel to areas that have known community acquired SARS, or through close personal contact with someone known to or suspected to have the illness. This exposure should be within 10 days of the start of symptoms. The revised Efficient hand hygiene remains the most important prevention practice, including changing gloves and either washing hands or using hand sanitizing substances immediately after contact with individuals with SARS.
case definitions now exclude cases in which there is no serological evidence of exposures to SARS CoY.
As noted in the February 2004 issue of Emerging Infectious Diseases (Lingappa, 2004) , the transmission of SARS appears to be heterogeneous, with large droplet transmission responsible for most of the spread of the disease. However, some clusters of disease appeared to have been spread through aerosol transmission of the virus. In addition to this, there have been isolated, documented cases of "superspreader events," in which transmission occurred from a single case to multiple secondary cases.
Efficient hand hygiene remains the most important prevention practice, including changing gloves and either washing hands or using hand sanitizing substances immediately after contact with individuals with SARS. Other important personal protective equipment (PPE) for use in the health care setting, but not in the general work environment, includes gowns, eye protection, and respiratory protection. The CDC has developed guidelines for the use of respirators to prevent transmission of SARS (CDC, 2oo3b), recommending N-95 respirators as the preferred PPE. (The designation N-95 indicates the respirator is non-oil resistant and is effective in filtering 95% of particulate matter from the air.) However, these respirators are expensive and require personal fitting for proper use. When N-95 and higher efficiency respirators are not available, the CDC recommends the use of surgical masks, which have been shown to be effective against the kind of large droplet transmission thought to be the primary route of trans-200 mission of SARS. In fact, Seto (2003) showed surgical masks to be highly effective in limiting the transmission of the disease.
EFFECT OF SARS ON HEALTH CARE WORKERS
SARS has been described as unique among recent emerging diseases because of its effect on HCWs (Hung, 2003) . Indeed, that more than 20% of the cases worldwide, and even greater percentages in selected locations, were among HCWs has profound implications for occupational health nurses-especially those working in hospitals and other health care settings. Two geographic areas were especially hard hit: Hong Kong, where almost 400 medical and nursing personnel were affected (Hung, 2003) ; and Canada, with more than 100 individuals affected (WHO, 2003) . The high rate of infection among HCWs in industrialized countries has been attributed to exposures during respiratory intensive treatments such as bag-valve-mask ventilation, endotracheal intubation, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, and administration of aerosolized medications, and with inadequate use of PPE (CDC, 2oo3a, 2004b; Hung, 2003) . Maunder (2003) described in detail the immediate occupational and psychological effect on HCWs in Toronto admitted to the hospital for treatment of SARS. The HCWs experienced profound feelings of isolation and depression. In addition, many felt guilty for possibly exposing their families to the disease. In fact, there were two children of HCWs who did contract SARS (Avendano, 2003; Maunder, 2003) . The HCWs also expressed a sense of guilt about missing work, and those admitted to the hospital expressed guilt about increasing the workload of their colleagues.
In the Hong Kong outbreak, 386 HCWs developed SARS, and 8 of them died. Hung (2003) reported a great deal of distress among HCWs because of the numbers affected. The disease spread rapidly, and little information was available to workers related to the isolation required to limit its spread. Masks, gowns, and gloves were in short supply, all of which contributed to the inability of HCWs to protect themselves adequately.
One of the critical consequences of this high rate of infection among HCWs was the reduction in available personnel to care for clients with SARS and other problems. HCWs who had worked in hospitals in which SARS was present were quarantined from work in other facilities. In Canada, this presented work force issues for the employing facilities, and stress among the workers because they were prohibited from earning part or all of their living during the period of quarantine (Maunder, 2003) .
ISOLATION AND USE OF PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT
The CDC recommends standard precautions, contact precautions, and respiratory precautions with suspected and probable clients with SARS (CDC, 2004b). The use of N-95 respirators, the ideal for respiratory precautions, poses some logistical challenges when used on a large scale and when recommended for use in front-line personnel such as emergency medical technicians (EMTs) and emergency department (ED) nurses.
First, to be used properly, these masks need to be fitted individually. In work settings with significant turnover, or in settings with temporary personnel or those only working limited numbers of shifts, this can be problematic. Second, these respirators should not be reused, which means they should be replaced whenever workers remove them, regardless of the reasons for doing so. In addition to these challenges, N-95 respirators are significantly more expensive than simple surgical masks. Fortunately, simple surgical masks are quite effective in limiting SARS transmission.
Discussion at the September 12 meeting in Atlanta, GA indicated some key points in proper use of PPE and isolation procedures. First, to be maximally effective, PPE has to be used properly, and removed properly, minimizing the opportunities for self-inoculation and crosscontamination between clients. Second. eye protection is an essential component of contact isolation that is frequently either neglected or used inappropriately. Simple eyeglasses are not considered a component of PPE. Third, rigorous hand hygiene remains the key component of all isolation procedures, and must be conducted after each client contact, as well as before the next contact. This includes cleansing hands prior to donning gloves, removing gloves and cleansing hands immediately after client contact, and avoiding self-inoculation. Staff members in some hospitals in Canada were observed to leave their gloves and gowns on between clients, thus contributing to the rise in antibiotic resistant nosocomial infections reported in some hospitals.
The use of PPE in EDs and by EMTs presents additional challenges, and the CDC has included guidelines for these workers addressing their needs (CDC, 2004a (CDC, , 2004b . In both cases, these workers will be dealing with large numbers of individuals who present with symptoms of fever, headache, and mild respiratory symptoms. Most of these individuals will not have SARS. These HCWs need to be especially alert for the level of SARS in their communities to determine which PPE is indicated. Public education needs were discussed at the September 12 meeting at the CDC. Topics included were: • Aspects of "respiratory etiquette" for clients (e.g., encouraging use of surgical masks in public and in ED and clinic waiting rooms). • Encouraging use of facial tissues to minimize droplet dispersal during coughing and sneezing. • Urging frequent hand hygiene.
Individuals with suspected or probable SARS should be placed in negative pressure isolation rooms as soon as possible. Physical isolation of these individuals may be especially problematic to ambulancebased HCWs, depending on the type of ambulance in which they are working. Some ambulances have client care compartments on separate ventilation systems from the drivers' compartments; others do not. When the ventilation system is shared, both the driver and client care person need to be wearing appropriate PPE. The CDC does recommend that whenever possible, clients suspected of having SARS wear a surgical mask whenever respiratory isolation is delayed or impracticable (CDC, 2004a) .
Special guidelines developed for HCWs involved in aerosol-producing respiratory procedures include: • Limiting the procedures to only those medically necessary.
• Performing the procedures in respiratory isolation rooms. • Using filters on exhaust valves on the equipment being used. • Increasing the use of PPE to cover all of the face, neck, and outer clothing.
Special efforts to decontaminate the environment after these procedures also have been recommended (CDC, 2004d) .
IMPLICATIONS FOR OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH NURSES
Occupational health nurses have several roles and responsibilities in preparing for a possible re-emergence of SARS. The first is to maintain currency with the case definition of SARS and the prevalence of SARS both worldwide and in their communities. It is also important to maintain the most current guidelines for managing SARS infections in the workplace, whether this is a health care or community setting. Management of workers possibly exposed to SARS falls into three main categories: • Surveillance of exposed workers for symptoms. • Ongoing monitoring of those possibly exposed. • Reporting, both internally in the workplace and externally to area health authorities, to colleagues in their communities, and to the public.
In non-health care settings. the guidelines address individual worker responsibility for monitoring and reporting. However, in health care settings, these responsibilities fall largely on the institution. and will in all probability rest with the occupational health nurses in those institutions (CDC 2004d) .
Identification of individuals with SARS depends on both the presence of clinical findings and a history of possible exposure. When SARS is present in the community or health care setting, surveillance can become burdensome. The level of surveillance and monitoring that occurred during the SARS outbreak in Toronto, where it was reported that more than 1.800 individuals were screened entering one hospital daily, resulted in significant logistical problems. On the other hand, this level of surveillance was probably instrumental in limiting the extent of the outbreak (Maunder, 2003) . It is imperative for occupational health nurses to be familiar with the case definition of SARS and the latest CDC recommendations for surveillance in their particular work settings (CDC, 2004c; CDC 2004d) . Unlike possibly exposed workers in other settings who may continue to work if they remain afebrile, HCWs with high risk SARS exposures should not be permitted in any health care setting for IO days following exposure. Thus, it is critical for occupational health nurses in these facilities will undoubtedly be actively involved in implementing these recommendations.
The responsibilities of occupational health nurses for workers who develop symptoms of SARS are also somewhat different, depending on whether or not SARS occurs in a health care setting. Within the health care setting, occupational health nurses are more involved with the ongoing monitoring of symptomatic workers than in non-health care settings. However, in both settings, symptomatic workers will be excluded from work and will be on home isolation unless there is a medical need for hospitalization. Regardless of the setting, workers should not return until 10 days after fever resolves, provided the respiratory symptoms have resolved or are resolving, and full medical clearance has been obtained.
The role of the occupational health nurses in reporting possible SARS exposure and infection is critical to managing any outbreak of the disease (SARS was added to the list of reportable diseases in June, 2003 [CDC, 2004c D. Participants at the September 12 meeting spoke repeatedly of how important such communication was-not only to keep the health authorities informed, but also to ensure occupational health nurses at nearby facilities were aware of the levels of exposure and infection among other workers in the area. It was only by communicating openly with each other that they were able to work effectively to limit the spread of the disease to a very few facilities and over a very short period of time.
Occupational health nurses should be in the forefront in preparing for a possible re-emergence of SARS. They should be intimately involved in educating and training workers within health care settings and beyond. One of their most important tasks will be to clarify the actual risks of infections should SARS re-emerge. Anecdotal reports at the CDC conference in September, 2003 indicated that effective communication was critical to obtaining compliance with efforts to reduce disease transmission.
Occupational health nurses should "bookmark" the CDC website for Public Health Guidance for Community-Level Preparedness and Response to SARS (www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/clinicalguidance.htm) for easy retrieval and reference. This document cites the lessons learned from the SARS epidemics of the 2002 to 2003 respiratory season and provides steps for implementing suggested practices. It goes beyond the issues of infection control, and includes suggestions for legal considerations, communications, laboratory functions, and other important considerations for developing a coordinated hospital and community-wide response to any re-emergence of the disease. Because this is a dynamic document that is changed as the state of the science changes, it is recommended that occupational health nurses check the CDC website frequently for updates. Finally, and most importantly, occupational health nurses continue to be a vital resource for facility managers and workers who depend on them for maintaining health and safety in the workplace environment.
Transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) related coronavirus (CoV) appears to be heterogeneous. Most transmission occurs through large droplets, but there is some evidence of spread through aerosol transmission. AAOHN ]ourna12004; 52(5), 199-203. 1 2 Proper use of personal protective equipment (PPE) and scrupulous attention to hand hygiene are critical to reducing transmission of SARS, especially in health care facilities. Surgical masks have been shown to be highly effective in reducing transmission when N-95 respirators are unavailable.
nurses to know who has been caring for individuals with SARS. They need to track those who may have been exposed through either a breach in infection control precautions or through unprotected exposure during high risk activities such as administration of aerosol respiratory treatment, emergency intubation, and bag-valve-mask resuscitation. Workers who have had unprotected exposure to individuals with SARS and are not of a high risk type do not need to be excluded from work. However, these workers should have their temperature monitored twice a day for 10 days post-exposure.
Because HCWs have been disproportionally affected by SARS, it is recommended that workers caring for individuals with SARS undergo continued surveillance and monitoring for the appearance of SARS symptoms even when they have adhered strictly to infection control guidelines. This ongoing monitoring, usually accomplished by taking workers' temperatures as they enter the building and having them complete a short symptom checklist, should continue until at least 10 days after the last SARS exposure. Occupational health
